Abstract. Over the last century, the principle of "induction on the continuum" has been studied by different authors in different formats. All of these different readings are equivalent to one of the three versions that we isolate in this paper. We also formalize those three forms (of "continuous induction") in first-order logic and prove that two of them are equivalent and sufficiently strong to completely axiomatize the first-order theory of the real closed (ordered) fields. We show that the third weaker form of continuous induction is equivalent with the Archimedean property. We study some equivalent axiomatizations for the theory of real closed fields and propose a firstorder scheme of the fundamental theorem of algebra as an alternative axiomatization for this theory (over the theory of ordered fields).
Introduction
Real Analysis is more than a haphazard accumulation of facts about the ordered field of real numbers R. Indeed, Real Analysis is a systematic study of R (and functions on R, etc.). The most usual systematic way of studying mathematical objects is via axiomatizations. Some axiomatic systems are just definitions; such as the axioms of Group Theory. Indeed, examples of groups abound in mathematics and other scientific fields. However, some axiomatizations are much deeper than definitions; one such example is the axiom system of Complete Ordered Fields. An ordered field is complete when it contains the supremum (least upper bound) of every nonempty and bounded subset of itself (let us note that this notion of completeness is formalized in second-order logic). There are lots of ordered fields in Mathematics, but only one of them, up to isomorphism, is complete (by Dedekind's Theorem; see e.g. [14] ). The assumption of the existence of a complete ordered field is not a trivial one; though many textbooks on Mathematical Real Analysis start off with the axioms of complete ordered fields, and take R as a (indeed, as the) model of this theory. Of course, this is not the only way to do real analysis; by the arithmetization of analysis, we can construct R from Q, and Q from Z, and finally Z from N. It should be pointed out that we can also reverse this foundational set-up by starting with the assumption that R is a complete ordered field; then we can construct Q as the smallest subfield of R, Z as the smallest sub-ring of R that contains 1, and N as the non-negative elements of Z.
Apart from these philosophical and foundational concerns, in this paper we are interested in the properties of R as a complete ordered field. Indeed, there are several different axiomatizations for the (second-order) theory of complete ordered fields, over the theory of Ordered Fields Ç : (1) the existence of supremum (the least upper bound) for every nonempty and bounded subset; (2) the existence of infimum (the greatest lower bound) for every nonempty and bounded subset; and (3) the nonexistence of cuts (with gaps), i.e., a partition into two disjoint subsets in such a way that every element of the first set is smaller than all the elements of the second set, and the first set has no greatest element and the second set has no smallest element. Interestingly, there are many different equivalent statements for the completeness axiom; indeed, as many as 72 of them are listed in [5] .
As shown by Tarski, the first-order theory of R, i.e., the collection of first-order sentences in the language of ordered fields that hold in the ordered field of real numbers, is axiomatizable by a computable set of axioms known to modern algebraists as Ê (real closed fields-see Definition 4.1). Therefore, Ê is a complete theory, i.e., any first order sentence formulated in the language of ordered fields is either provable or refutable in Ê . This is in sharp contrast to the semiring N of natural numbers, the ring Z of integers, and the field Q of rationals, none of whose first-order theories can be axiomatized by a computable set of axioms, thanks to the work of Kurt Gödel (for N and Z) and Julia Robinson (for Q). Thus, the formalization of the fundamentals of Real Analysis naturally leads to central concepts in Modern Algebra. As we shall see, formalizing various completeness axioms for the ordered field of real numbers may (in some cases) give rise to various axiomatizations of the theory of real closed fields.
In Section 2 we isolate three schemes of the principle of continuous induction, since all the different formats of this principle that have appeared in the literature over the last century are equivalent to one of these three versions. We will show that two of them are equivalent to each other, and to the completeness principle over Ç ; while the third one is weaker. We formalize these three schemes in first-order logic and will compare their strength with each other. In Section 3 we study some first-order formalizations of the completeness axiom (of ordered fields) and will see their equivalence with one another by first-order proofs. We will show that the weak principle of continuous induction is equivalent to the Archimedean property (of ordered abelian groups), and the first-order formalization of the (two equivalent) strong principle(s) of continuous induction can axiomatize the theory of real closed fields (over Ç ). In Section 4 we study the theory of real closed fields more deeply and introduce a first-order scheme of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra as an alternative axiomatization of this theory over Ç . In Section 5, we summarize the new and old results of the paper and propose a set of open problems for future investigations. In the Appendix we present a slightly modified proof of Kreisel and Krivine [11, Chapter 4, Theorem 7] for Tarski's Theorem on the completeness (and the decidability of a first-order axiomatization) of the theory of real closed fields.
Continuous Induction, Formalized in First-Order Logic
"Continuous Induction", "Induction over the Continuum", "Real Induction", "Non-Discrete Induction", or the like, are some terms used by authors for referring to some statements about the continuum R. These statements are as strong as the Completeness Axiom of R and a motivation for their introduction into the literature of mathematics is the easy and sometimes unified ways they provide for proving some basic theorems of Mathematical Analysis. Here, we do not intend to give a thorough history of the subject or list all of the relevant literature in the References. For a "telegraphic history" we refer the reader to [10] ; and for an introduction to the subject we refer to [4] and the references therein. The earliest use of continuous induction is perhaps the paper [3] dating back to 1919. Below, we will formalize it in first-order logic. We will also formalize the formulations of continuous induction presented in [4, 9, 10] and [8] ; and later will compare their strength with each other. Let us finally note that [12] is the only textbook (in Persian/Farsi) in which we could find some mention of continuous induction (referring to [9] ).
The principle of continuous induction introduced in [3] (see also [4] ) is equivalent to the following statement:
For any S ⊆ R, if 1. for some a ∈ R we have ]− ∞, a] ⊆ S, and 2. there exists some ε>0 such that for all
Its formalization in first-order logic (where the language contains {<, 0, +}) is:
Let Á 1 (definable continuous induction) be the following first-order scheme
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula. ✧ Continuous induction in [10] (see also [9] and [4] ) is equivalent to the following:
For any S ⊆ R, if
1. for some a ∈ R we have ]− ∞, a[ ⊆ S, and 2. for any
Let us note that this form of real induction can be formulated by using < only: For any S ⊆ R, if 1. for some a ∈ R we have ]− ∞, a[ ⊆ S, and
The first-order formalization of this is:
for an arbitrary formula ϕ. ✧ When the first-order language contains 0 and + also, then this can be formalized as
Note that in Á 1 there exists a fixed ε>0 such that for all x the second assumption holds, but in Á for any x there exists some ε x >0 (which depends on x) such that the second assumption holds.
Finally, there exists a third version of continuous induction which appears in [8] :
For any S ⊆ R, if 
Its formalization in the first-order languages that contain < is as follows:
Let Á 2 denote the first-order scheme
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula. ✧ Now, we compare the strength of these three schemes with each other.
In any linear order D; < , the scheme Á holds, if and only if Á 2 holds.
Proof:
The proof of Á =⇒ Á 2 is rather easy (and so it is left to the reader). For Á 2 =⇒ Á, suppose that Á 2 holds in a linearly ordered set D; < , and assume that for a formula ϕ(x) and some a ∈ D we have (i) ∀y<a ϕ(y), and
(ii) ∀x ∀y<x ϕ(y) → ∃z>x ∀y<z ϕ(y) . Now, we show that the following relations hold:
(1) ∃x ∀y x ϕ(y), (2) ∀x ∀y x ϕ(y) → ∃z>x ∀y<z ϕ(y) , and
This will show (by using Á 2 ) that ∀xϕ(x) holds.
The relation (2) follows straightforwardly from (ii). For (3) fix some d ∈ D and assume that ∀y<d ϕ(y) holds. Then by (ii) there exists some d ′ >d such that ∀y<d ′ ϕ(y) holds too. Whence, ϕ(d) holds as well. The relation (1) holds for x=a for exactly the same reason. ❑ It follows from the proof of Theorem 2.7 that Á and Á 2 are equivalent with each other, in any linear order. Now we show that Á 1 is strictly weaker than Á (and Á 2 ).
In any ordered divisible abelian group, if Á holds, then Á 1 holds too. But not vice versa: Á 1 holds in the rational numbers Q but Á does not.
Suppose that Á holds in such a structure D; +, 0, <, L . For proving Á 1 suppose that for some formula ϕ and some ε, a ∈ D with ε>0 we have (i) ∀y a ϕ(y) and from (1) and (2) . Now, we show that Á 1 holds in the (ordered field of) rational numbers Q but Á does not. For proving Q Á 1 suppose that for some formula ϕ and some numbers ε, r ∈ Q with ε >0 we have (i) ∀y r ϕ(y) and (ii) ∀x ϕ(x) → ∀y [x y x+ε → ϕ(y)] . We show that ∀x ϕ(x) holds in Q; if not, then A = {q ∈ Q | ¬ϕ(q)} is nonempty and bounded below by r. Let α = inf A (∈ R). So, there exists some s ∈ A with α <s<α + ε 2 , and there exists some t ∈ Q with α − ε 2 <t <α. By t <α = inf A we have t ∈ A and so ϕ(t) holds. Then by (ii) we should have ϕ(y) for all y ∈ [t,t +ε], and in particular ϕ(s), since we already have t<α<s<α + ε 2 <t+ε; which is a contradiction with s ∈ A . We now show
Obviously, (1) ∀y<0 ϕ(y) holds and we show that (2) ∀x ∀y<x ϕ(y) → ∃ε>0 ∀y<x+ε ϕ(y) holds as well. But clearly ∀x ϕ(x) does not hold since ϕ (2) is not true; this will show that Á is not true in Q. For showing (2) fix an r ∈ Q and assume that ∀y<r ϕ(y). We show ∃ε>0 ∀y<r+ε ϕ(y) by distinguishing the following three cases:
(II) If r = 0, then for ε = 1 we have ∀y<r+ε ϕ(y).
(III) If r>0, then we have r 2 <2, since r 2 = 2 is impossible (by √ 2 ∈ Q) and if r 2 >2, then we cannot have ∀y<r ϕ(y) because for y = r 2 +2 2r we have 0<y<r and y 2 −2 = (
2r+1 }; then 0<ε 1. For showing ∀y<r+ε ϕ(y), take some y with 0 y<r+ε. Then y 2 −2<(r+ε) 2 −2 = (r 2 −2)+ε(2r+ε) (r 2 −2)+ε(2r+1) (r 2 −2)+(2−r 2 ) = 0. So, y 2 <2, thus ϕ(y) holds for any y<r+ε. ❑ Therefore, Á 1 cannot be regarded as a genuine "continuous induction"; even though it is a kind of "non-discrete induction" since it does not hold in Z or N. But since it holds in Q then it is not really an "induction on the continuum". In the next section we will see the real reason for regarding Á (and also its equivalent Á 2 ) as a genuine "continuous induction", and not regarding Á 1 as a true "induction on the continuum".
First-Order Completeness Axioms for the Field of Real Numbers
In Mathematical Analysis, R is usually introduced as a Complete Ordered Field; indeed by a theorem of Dedekind there exists only one complete ordered field up to isomorphism. In most of the textbooks on Mathematical Analysis, the existence of a complete ordered field is assumed as an axiom; in some other textbooks, a complete ordered field is constructed from Q either by Dedekind Cuts or by Cauchy Sequences. The most usual Completeness Axiom in the analysis textbooks is the existence of supremum for any non-empty and bounded above subset; its first-order version is as follows:
Let ¹ËÙÔ (Definable Supremum Property) be the following first-order scheme
where ϕ is an arbitrary formula. ✧ Informally, ¹ËÙÔ says that for a nonempty (∃x ϕ(x)) and bounded from above set (for some y we
there exists a least upper bound (for some z, any y is an upper bound if and only if y z). A dual statement is the principle of the existence of infimum for any nonempty and bounded from below set:
Let ¹ÁÒ be the first-order scheme
The scheme ¹ÁÒ is used by Tarski (1940) for presenting a complete first-order axiomatic system for the ordered field of real numbers (see [6] ). The usual real analytic proof for the equivalence of these two schemes works in first-order logic as well:
In any linear order D; < , the scheme ¹ËÙÔ holds, if and only if ¹ÁÒ holds.
Proof:
We prove only ¹ËÙÔ =⇒ ¹ÁÒ ; its converse can be proved by a dual argument. Suppose that for some ϕ(x) and a, b
Now, by ¹ËÙÔ there exists some c ∈ D such that
We show ∀z ∀x
, and so z c. (II) If z c, then for any x<z we have c x and so (1) implies that for some u we have ψ(u) and u x. Now, ψ(u) and x<u imply that ¬ϕ(x).
Another completeness principle is the so called Dedekind's Axiom; which says that there is no proper cut (with a gap) in R. The following is a first-order writing of an equivalent form of this axiom:
where ϕ and ψ are arbitrary formulas. ✧ Tarski (1941, 1946 ) used this axiom scheme for presenting another complete first-order axiomatic system for R (see [6] ). Indeed, in linearly ordered sets, the axiom scheme ¹ ÙØ is equivalent with the other completeness axioms schemes of ¹ËÙÔ and ¹ÁÒ :
In any linear order D; < , the scheme ¹ËÙÔ holds, if and only if ¹ ÙØ holds.
If ¹ËÙÔ holds in a linear order D; < , then for showing ¹ ÙØ assume that for ϕ(x), ψ(x) and
we show the existence of some
. Now, by (i), we have (1) ϕ(a) and, by (ii), we have
We show that ∀x∀y [ϕ(x) ∧ ψ(y) → x c y] holds. By (3), for y= c, we have x c for any x with ϕ(x). First, assume that ∀x [ϕ(x) → x y]; then ¬ϕ(y) holds by the assumption (II). So, ψ(y) holds and therefore c y by (3) .
Second, assume that c y but ϕ(x) ∧ x y for some x. Then by (3), and ϕ(x), we should have x c but this contradicts c y<x! ❑ Finally, we observe that continuous induction is equivalent to (any of) the (above) completeness axiom(s), even in first-order logic:
In any linear order D; < , the scheme ¹ÁÒ holds, if and only if Á holds.
Suppose that ¹ÁÒ holds in the linear order D; < . For proving Á, assume that for ϕ and some a∈D we have (i) ∀y<a ϕ(y) and (ii) ∀x ∀y<x ϕ(y) → ∃z>x ∀y<z ϕ(y) ; then we show that ∀x ϕ(x). If for some b∈D we had ¬ϕ(b), then put ϕ ′ (x)=¬ϕ(x). Now we have (1) 
by (i). By the assumption ¹ÁÒ there exists some element c ∈ D for which we have
or, equivalently, (3) ∀y [y c ↔ ∀x<y ϕ(x)]. Thus, ∀x<c ϕ(x) and so by (ii) there exists some d ∈ D such that d>c and ∀y<d ϕ(y). By (3), since d>c, there exists some x<d such that ¬ϕ(x). This is a contradiction, since we had ∀y<d ϕ(y).
by (iv) we should have ∀x<z 0 ϕ ′ (x). Whence, (2) holds, and we can apply Á; which implies that ∀x ϕ ′ (x) and this contradicts (i). Therefore, for some z ∈ D, (iii) should hold. 
Suppose that the ordered abelian group G; +, 0, < has the Archimedean property ( È) and we have
for a subset A ⊆ G and some ε, a∈G with ε>0. By induction on n∈N we can show that (iii) ]− ∞, a+n ε] ⊆ A : for n=0 it follows from (i) and the induction step follows from (ii). For an arbitrary x ∈ G, by È there exists some n ∈ N such that x−a<n ε; so we have x ∈ A by (iii). Whence, A = G; and so Á 1 holds in G. Now, suppose that the ordered abelian group G; +, 0, < satisfies Á 1 . For any a, b ∈ G with a>0 let B = {x ∈ G | ∃n ∈ N : x<n a}. Then we obviously have (i) ]− ∞, 0] ⊆ B; we show that (ii) for
For any x ∈ B we have x<m a for some m ∈ N; so for any y∈ [x, x+a] we have y x+a<(m+1) a, and so y∈ B. Thus, by Á 1 , from (i) and (ii), we should have B = G, and so for any b ∈ S there exists some n ∈ N such that b<n a; whence G has È.
❑
Let us note that Theorem 3.8 gives another proof for Q Á 1 (and also Q Á 1 ) that was proved already in Theorem 2.8. So, Á 1 can be added to the list of 42 equivalent forms of the Archimedean property (of ordered fields) in [5] . Whence, while the principle of continuous induction in Definitions 2.3 ( Á) and 2.5 ( Á 2 ) are equivalent with the completeness axiom (in the ordered fields), the principle Á 1 is equivalent with the Archimedean property (and is not equivalent with the completeness axiom) in such fields.
Real Closed Fields, a First-Order Logical Study
What makes the Real Closed Fields interesting in Mathematical Logic is Tarski's Theorem that, Th( R; +, 0, −, <, ×, 1 ), the complete first-order theory of the ordered field of real numbers is decidable and axiomatizable by the theory of real closed (ordered) fields (see e.g. [11] ) . The real closed fields are studied thoroughly in Algebra and Algebraic Geometry (see e.g. [1] ); here we study some equivalent axiomatizations of the first-order theory of real closed fields. The most usual definition of a real closed field is an ordered field which satisfies the following axiom scheme:
Let Ê be the following axiom scheme:
for n ∈ N with n>1, together with the axioms of Ordered Fields (Ç ). ✧ By definition, a real closed field is an ordered field in which every positive element has a square root and every odd-degree polynomial has a root in it. This most usual definition of real closed fields is in fact the most inapplicable one, since many interesting theorems on and about real closed fields use other equivalent definitions. The most applicable (and the most fruitful) definition of real closed fields is the one which says that a real closed field is an ordered field in which the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT) holds:
Definition 4.2. (ÁÎÌ)
Let ÁÎÌ be the first-order scheme We can write any odd-degree polynomial as p(x)=x 2n+1 +∑ i 2n a i x i by multiplying with an x-free term, if necessary. Let v = 1+∑ i 2n |a i | and u = −v. Then u −1 < 0 < 1 v, so |u|, |v| 1. Now, by u+∑ i |a i | =−1 and the triangle inequality, we have p(u) u 2n+1 +∑ i 2n |a i ||u| i u 2n+1 +∑ i 2n |a i |u 2n = u 2n (u+∑ i 2n |a i |) = −u 2n <0, and
Now, the desired conclusion follows from ÁÎÌ by u<v and p(u)<0<p(v).
❑
As some other uses of the ÁÎÌ let us take a look at some real analytic theorems that are proved algebraically (cf. [1] ). • (ap) ′ = ap ′ for a constant (i.e., an x-free term) a,
• (p+q) ′ = p ′ +q ′ , and
which can be verified rather easily. For example, the last item can be verified by noting that the coefficient of
in which the first summand is the coefficient of x k−1 in (p ′ ·q) and the second summand is the coefficient of
It goes without saying that the properties mentioned in Remark 4.5 are the ones that are usually learnt in elementary calculus through the analytic methods (cf. [14] ); so are the following theorem and lemma. 
Derivative Signs easily follows from the Mean Value Theorem: for any such u, v there exists
The last (and the strongest) witness for the strength of ÁÎÌ is Tarski's Theorem that proves that the theory Ç +ÁÎÌ is complete; i.e., for any sentence θ in the language of ordered fields either we have Ç +ÁÎÌ ⊢ θ or we have Ç +ÁÎÌ ⊢ ¬θ . In the Appendix we present a somewhat modified proof of Kreisel and Krivine [11] for this result (Theorem 5.1). Let us then note this last result implies that every statement that is true in R is provable from ÁÎÌ (+Ç ). Since, otherwise its negation would have been provable, and this would contradict its truth in R. Thus, for example we have ÁÎÌ =⇒ ¹ËÙÔ (and also ÁÎÌ =⇒ Á and ÁÎÌ =⇒ ¹ ÙØ, etc.) over the theory Ç . Moreover, if an axiom (or an axiom scheme) that is true in R can prove ÁÎÌ, then it is actually equivalent with ÁÎÌ; and so can be used as another axiomatization of the theory of real closed fields (over Ç ). So, by the following theorem (4.8), all the schemes that we have considered so far (except Á 1 ) are equivalent with ÁÎÌ. We will need the following lemma for proving ¹ÁÒ =⇒ ÁÎÌ. This could also be proved directly by the elementary analytic way (using Lemma 4.7): for a given a>0, the infimum x of the (definable) set {u | u>0 ∧ u 2 >a} satisfies x 2 = a, and the infimum y of the set {u | (u 2n+1 +∑ i 2n a i u i ) > 0} satisfies y 2n+1 +∑ i 2n a i y i = 0. ✧ So, from Theorem 5.1 we will have ÁÎÌ ≡ ¹ÁÒ ≡ ¹ËÙÔ ≡ ¹ ÙØ ≡ Á ≡ Á 2 . As for Ê , we have shown only the conditional ÁÎÌ =⇒ Ê in Theorem 4.3. Its converse (Ê =⇒ ÁÎÌ) is usually proved in the literature by first proving the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra; which says that the field R(ı ) is algebraically closed, where F(ı ) is the result of adjoining ı = √ −1 to F (see e.g. [1, Theorem 2.11]). A field is called algebraically closed when any polynomial with coefficients in it has a root (in that field). As a matter of fact, an equivalent definition for real closed fields in the literature is that "an ordered field F is real closed if and only if the field F(ı ) is algebraically closed". An equivalent statement is that "an ordered field is real closed if and only if every positive element has a square root and any polynomial can be factorized into linear and quadratic factors". This is also an equivalent form of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra (for R); for which we propose the following first-order scheme: Definition 4.10. ( Ì RCF ) Let Ì RCF denote the conjunction of ∀x>0 ∃y (y 2 = x) and the following first-order scheme
for any n ∈ N with n>1. ✧ So, Ì RCF says that any even-degree polynomial can be factorized as a product of some quadratic polynomials. The following theorem is proved in e.g. [1, Theorem 2.11]; here we present a different proof:
Any ordered field that satisfies Ì RCF satisfies ÁÎÌ too.
Proof:
For a polynomial p(x) with degree m, suppose that p(u) · p(v)<0 for some u, v with u<v.
. Then q(x)=x 2m +r(x 2 ) for a polynomial r(x) whose degree is less than m. By Ì RCF we have q(x) = ∏ j<m (x 2 +b j x+c j ) for some {b j } j<m and {c j } j<m . Now, that any odd-degree polynomial has a root. So, one can prove, by an induction on the degree of the polynomials that, when Ì RCF holds, every polynomial can be written as the product of some linear and quadratic factors. Let us also note that Ì RCF =⇒ Ê could be proved directly as follows:
for a given odd-degree polynomial p(x) = x 2n+1 +∑ i 2n a i x i , multiply it with x to get an even-degree polynomial x · p(x) = x 2n+2 +∑ 2n i=0 a i x i+1 . By Ì RCF there exist some {b j } j n and {c j } j n such that 
Conclusions and Open Problems
Continuous Induction has been around in the literature over the last century (starting from [3] in 1919). We isolated three versions of it (Definitions 2.1,2.3,2.5, noting that all the other formats are equivalent to one of these three) and formalized them in first-order logic (Definitions 2.2,2.4,2.6) for the first time here. We showed that two of them are equivalent with each other (Theorem 2.7) while the third one (and the oldest one) is not (Theorem 2.8). Actually, those two strong versions are equivalent to the completeness of an ordered field, but the third one is equivalent to the Archimedean property (Theorem 3.8) and not with the completeness axiom. We noted that the first-order formulations of those two strong continuous induction schemes can completely axiomatize the real closed ordered fields (cf. Theorem 3.6). For this theory we collected some axiomatizations ( ¹ ÙØ ⇐ === (3.5) ⇒ ¹ËÙÔ ⇐ === (3.3) ⇒ ¹ÁÒ ⇐ === = by iterating some classical theorems of Mathematical Analysis was to put emphasize on their first-order formalizability. Indeed, being formalizable in logic is not a trivial matter. All our proofs (except the proof of Theorem 3.8) were first-order.
(¾) The second open problem is a nice and neat first-order proof of Ê =⇒ Ì RCF (closing the gap in the diagram). As we noted earlier, there are some second-order proofs for this (e.g. the Proofs Three and Four for the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra in [7] ). By Gödel's Completeness Theorem (for first-order logic) there should exist such proofs; but what are they? As a matter of fact, any such proof will be a beautiful proof of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, which is completely real analytic (not referring to complex numbers) and it will be a first-order proof of the theorem, for the first time.
(¿) One research area which is wide open to explore, is the formalization of the other equivalent axiomatizations of the complete ordered fields in first-order logic; and seeing whether any of them can completely axiomatize the theory of real closed fields (over Ç ). Or more generally, does the theory Ç +Θ, where Θ is a first-order formalization of any of the 72 completeness axioms in [5] , completely axiomatize the theory of real closed fields? This question is not easy, since for example neither Ç +ÊÓÐÐ nor Ç +ÅÎÌ is equivalent with the theory of real closed fields (see [13, 2] ). As we saw above, Ç +Θ axiomatizes the real closed fields if and only if Ç +Θ ⊢ ÁÎÌ. Let us note that Ì RCF is not a first-order formalization of any of the completeness axioms in [5] .
Whence, we show the equivalence of all the formulas in the following form with a quantifier-free formula:
This will be proved by induction on the degree of a formula which we define as follows:
-finally the deg x of a formula is the maximum of the deg x 's of its atomic sub-formulas.
What we prove is:
and moreover the deg y of {Φ k (y), Ψ k (y)}'s are less than deg x (ϕ (a, b) ).
This will be shown by induction onh = deg x ϕ(a, b) ; let us note that here a, b are treated as (new) variables. Ifh = 0, then x appears only superficially in ϕ(a, b) and so it is equivalent with a quantifierfree formula. Now, suppose that we have the desired conclusion (⋆) for all the formulas with deg x less thanh.
(1) First, we consider the case of ℓ = 0; i.e., the formulas that are in the following form: 
, and 
for some x-free formulas {Φ k (y), Ψ k (y)} k<m whose deg y are less thanh. So, for any i<n, G i (a, b) is equivalent to the disjunction of the formulas (over k<m):
are less thanh then the induction hypothesis (⋆) applies to all G i 's. Finally, for H i, j (a, b) we note that it is equivalent with the disjunction (over k < m) of the following formulas: (2) Second, we consider the case of ℓ>0; let us note that we can assume ℓ = 1 since we have i<ℓ α i = 0 ⇐⇒ ∑ i<ℓ α 2 i = 0. So, we may replace all the p i (x)'s with a single polynomial ∑ i<ℓ p 2 i (x); but this will increase the deg x of the resulted formula. There is another way of reducing ℓ (the number of polynomials p i 's) without increasing the deg x of the formula:
(I) For polynomials p(x) = αx d +∑ i<d a i x i and q(x) = β x e +∑ j<e b j x j assume that d e. Put r(x) = q(x)−β x e and s(x) = β p(x) − αx d−e q(x); then we have p(u) = q(u) = 0 ⇐⇒ β = 0 ∧ p(u) = r(u) = 0 ∨ β = 0 ∧ s(u) = q(u) = 0 . Continuing this way, at least one of the two polynomials will disappear and we will be left with at most one polynomial; and the deg x of the last formula will be non-greater than the deg x of the first formula.
So, we can safely assume that ℓ = 1; thus ϕ(a, b) = ∃x ∈]a, b[: p(x) = 0 ∧ j<n q j (x)>0 and also deg x (ϕ(a, b) ) =h. We can still transform the formula to an equivalent one in which we have that deg x q j <deg x p for all j < n:
(II) If, say, deg x q 1 deg x p, then write p(x) = αx d +∑ i<d a i x i and q 1 (x) = β x e +∑ j<e b j x j with d e.
Put r(x) = p(x)−αx d and s(x) = α 2 q 1 (x)−αβ x e−d p(x); then we have p(u) = 0 ∧ q 1 (u)>0 ⇐⇒ α = 0 ∧ r(u) = 0 ∧ q 1 (u)>0 ∨ α = 0 ∧ p(u) = 0 ∧ s(u)>0 . Continuing this way, either the equality (p(x)= 0) will disappear (and so we will have the first case) or the degree of the inequality deg x (q(x)>0) will be non-greater than the degree of the equality, deg x (p(x) = 0). So, assume that in the formula The formula (i) has been treated before (it is equivalent to a formula with deg x less thanh). The formulas (ii) and (iii) can be equivalently transformed to formulas with deg x less thanh by (I) and (II) above. So, the whole formula ϕ 2 , and very similarly ϕ 3 , can be written in equivalent forms in such a way that the induction hypothesis (⋆) applies to them. ❑
